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introduction: constitutionalism and democratic 
authority 
The conﬂict between various versions of “originalism” and “living constitu-
tionalism” has deﬁned the landscape of constitutional theory and practice for 
more than a generation, and it shows no sign of abating. Although each camp 
has developed a variety of methodological approaches and substantive distinc-
tions, each one also returns to a core concern: the democratic authority of con-
stitutional review. The late Justice Scalia crystallized the originalist concern in 
his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges: “It is of overwhelming importance . . . who it 
is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million 
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme 
Court.”1 The concern voiced by Scalia is, in a word, usurpation—the arrogation 
of the right to rule by the judiciary, invoking the authority of the Constitution’s 
“We the People,”2 but responding, in fact, to the vicissitudes of present-day party 
politics, social movements, and what Scalia once famously called “Kulturkampf.”3 
On the living-constitutionalist side, the core concern is the Constitution’s legiti-
macy in the eyes of those it rules today. Here, too, it might be said that the ques-
tion remains “who it is that rules me.” But living constitutionalism holds that 
“my Ruler” cannot legitimately be the mummiﬁed hand of those who ratiﬁed 
constitutional text long ago, when “the people” was restricted to adult white 
males (and o�en to property holders) and formal discrimination on racial and 
other grounds was widespread. Whatever “equal protection” or a “right of the 
people” might have meant to their ratiﬁers, the argument goes, legitimacy re-
quires that they be acceptable to a twenty-ﬁrst century polity when they are in-
voked today to weigh the constitutionality of state action. 
Usurpation of past lawmaking by present-day interpreters, or the tyranny of 
the dead over the living: this dilemma has seemed insoluble. In acknowledging 
the appeal of the contending positions, scholars and judges have staked out and 
criticized a variety of compromise formations, including “living originalism,”4 
“faint-hearted originalism,”5 and versions of “democratic constitutionalism” in 
 
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
3. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
4. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-73 (2011) (setting out the basic position of 
“living originalism”). 
5. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (de-
scribing “faint-hearted originalist[s]” and “moderate” non-originalists). 
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which the demos is conceived of as arguing over the meaning to be given today 
to the inherited text of fundamental law.6 
For all the attention to the legal culture and linguistic practices of the Found-
ing Era that has resulted from the prominence of originalism,7 comparatively 
few scholars have focused on the original idea of constitutionalism. What legal 
and political signiﬁcance did the act of constitution-making have for the dra�ers 
and ratiﬁers of the U.S. Constitution (and, earlier, the state constitutions)? How 
might that historical understanding illuminate today’s debates, not just over the 
nuances of interpreting the constitutional text, but also over political legitimacy 
in a constitutional order? 
Richard Tuck’s The Sleeping Sovereign is not a work of constitutional theory, 
but rather a careful historical reconstruction of the “invention” of modern de-
mocracy—including, centrally, a discussion of the authority that popular consti-
tution-making was understood to have at the Founding.8 Nonetheless, its impli-
cations for contemporary constitutional debates are arresting. In a work that 
contains only a few tentative closing words about the last century-plus of con-
stitutionalism, Tuck shows that today’s originalism, for all its talk of ﬁdelity to 
law’s origins, is profoundly unfaithful to the very theory of constitutional self-
rule on which it made best sense in the ﬁrst place. 
If today’s originalism contradicts its own commitment to constitutional self-
rule, though, living constitutionalism fares little better. Tuck’s reconstruction 
shows that the original purpose of constitution-making was to enable the people 
themselves to author their fundamental law, rather than leaving that legislation 
to the decisions of government oﬃcials and well-connected elites. Tuck’s account 
makes it diﬃcult to avoid the conclusion that today’s living constitutionalism 
fails in both theory and practice to avoid de facto constitutional lawmaking by 
oﬃcials and elites, fairly inviting familiar charges of usurpation—just as today’s 
originalism fairly invites charges of upholding the tyranny of the dead. 
 
6. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374-76 (2007) (describing the political and cultural dynamics of 
“democratic constitutionalism”); Lawrence Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
269 (2017) (oﬀering an exceptionally subtle and nuanced account of originalist interpreta-
tion). 
7. On the turn to history that accompanied originalism, see Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism 
and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 655-58 (2013); and Laura Kalman, Border 
Patrol: Reﬂections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 87-89 
(1997). 
8. RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (2016). 
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This dilemma is not contingent but rather is deeply rooted in the U.S. Con-
stitution. Both originalism and living constitutionalism ultimately fail to recon-
cile constitutional authority with popular sovereignty, owing to the way in which 
the Constitution both emerged from the tradition of democratic sovereignty and 
betrayed it. This produced a political community that is at once committed to 
ruling itself and unable to do so.9 
The image of Tuck’s title—the “sleeping sovereign”—expresses the crux of 
this dilemma. Thomas Hobbes argued in On the Citizen that, when a sovereign 
is asleep, his ministers do not take over his sovereignty. Their role is simply to 
carry out orders he issued before nodding oﬀ—a role that would include issuing 
commands in his name on quotidian matters in line with past commands.10 By 
implication, in a democratic regime, the sovereign people can be said to act 
through plebiscitary initiative and then “go to sleep,” leaving the “government” 
(which would include, in the United States, the Supreme Court) to administer 
its fundamental law.11 But the U.S. Constitution no longer works from the point 
of view of popular sovereignty. It is now so diﬃcult to amend under Article V 
that our popular sovereign is hardly able to stir, let alone issue lucid new com-
mands.12 Government oﬃcials must accordingly interpret increasingly remote 
constitutional text, or else must incorporate changing norms and the demands 
of social and partisan movements that do not rise to the level of unambiguous 
sovereign lawmaking (and, to continue with the Hobbesian imagery, amount to 
no more than the sovereign’s drowsy mumblings). American constitutional prac-
tice thus emerges as an especially vexed engagement with the fundamental prob-
lem of modern democracy: how an intermittently assembled democratic sover-
eign can both authorize and discipline the government that legislates and 
otherwise rules on its behalf in the interim. 
 
9. In advancing this argument, we are in line with earlier diagnosticians of the incapacity of con-
stitutional argument to do what is asked of it without special pleading and bad faith. See SAN-
FORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 886-90 (2016). We go where those earlier arguments have not in two 
ways. We ground the possibility of good-faith appeal to a sovereign people in an ongoing 
practice of speciﬁcally sovereign lawmaking, and we root the central dilemma of American 
constitutionalism in the brief ﬂowering and subsequent disappearance of such lawmaking. 
10. TUCK, supra note 8, at 89 (citing THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 99-100 (Richard Tuck & 
Michael Silverthorne, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998) (1642)). 
11. For a discussion of Hobbes’s arguments, see id. at 86-90, and for a discussion of their impli-
cations for democratic constitutionalism, see id. at 249-52. 
12. As we discuss later, this inhibition may be even worse than it appears on its face, as amend-
ments ratiﬁed entirely through the organs of ordinary government, such as state legislatures, 
would not even count as products of unmediated popular sovereignty on the traditional view. 
See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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This Review proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide an overview of Tuck’s 
arguments in The Sleeping Sovereign. We focus in particular on tracing his theo-
rization of the foundational distinction between “sovereignty” and “govern-
ment” from premodern conceptions and practices in which the distinction was 
absent through its development by Hobbes, Rousseau, and others, including the 
American and French revolutionaries. In Part II, we consider two ways in which 
the people have been treated as the authors of fundamental law in contemporary 
constitutional theory. Speciﬁcally, we adapt the sovereignty-government distinc-
tion at the heart of the theory of the modern democratic state to articulate two 
interrelated constitutional ontologies implied by the original theory of constitu-
tionalism: the “sleeping sovereign” and the “constitutional multitude.” In Part 
III, we turn to consider several current American constitutional and jurispruden-
tial debates in light of this account. 
i .  the political theory of modern constitutionalism 
To understand the original theory of modern constitutionalism, it is neces-
sary to understand the original problem that constitutionalism was meant to 
solve: not whether but how “the people” were understood to participate in gov-
ernment, and speciﬁcally whether they could ever make their own laws—that is, 
rule themselves. Constitutionalism opened a new front in answering this ques-
tion. Its contribution, Tuck argues, was nothing less than to make democracy 
conceivable in the modern world. 
As medieval and early-modern Europeans understood it, the democracy of 
the ancient Greek city-states required citizens to be constantly active in making 
and administering their own laws.13 This level of active engagement seemed im-
possible under post-classical conditions. Early-modern Europeans were dis-
persed across kingdoms that were orders of magnitude larger than the demo-
cratic city-states of antiquity, and they were too busy with everyday aﬀairs to 
replicate Greek self-rule (which was frequently, if erroneously, argued to have 
 
13. The most famous version of this argument is from Benjamin Constant’s speech given at the 
Athénée Royal in Paris, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns. Benjamin 
Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, in POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 314 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1819) (arguing 
that without slavery the Athenian demos would not have had time to carry out its self-govern-
ment: “Without the slave population of Athens, 20,000 Athenians could never have spent 
every day at the public square in discussions.”). But see ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, PEASANT-
CITIZENS AND SLAVE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 1-2, 5-6 (1988) (arguing 
that, on the contrary, Athenian democracy owed its success to the relative absence of depend-
ent labor). 
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depended on slavery to liberate the citizen-body for political engagement).14 Alt-
hough early-modern monarchies routinely claimed to derive their authority 
from “the people” (despite the modern stereotype of monarchical absolutism de-
rived from “divine right,” which was in fact a marginal theory mostly absent from 
political practice15), rulers and theorists alike assumed that in modern conditions 
the people could no longer speak or act collectively—and, thus, could no longer 
actually rule themselves. In their place, monarchs, parliamentary representa-
tives, and other elites provided virtual representation, popular consultation, and 
protection of the common good.16 
Modern constitutionalism, Tuck argues, oﬀered a new way for the whole cit-
izenry to act collectively to make its own law. The key was to set apart from the 
ordinary business of ruling a special kind of lawmaking, which promulgated the 
fundamental law of a polity.17 Such fundamental law could be enshrined in a con-
stitution which was approved by a popularly elected convention or, ideally, by a 
plebiscite in which the majority of the community directly decided its basic 
norms.18 In the tradition of thought that Tuck traces, this power to make funda-
mental law came to be called sovereignty, and the concept of sovereignty allowed 
democracy to be redeﬁned for modern conditions as a polity in which the whole 
people held sovereign power.19 This implied a distinction between sovereignty 
and those lesser acts of ruling that did not create fundamental law but simply 
represented the everyday activity of politics, called “administration” or govern-
ment.20 A government, in this latter sense, might be monarchical, parliamentary, 
or something else, depending on its composition; but, whatever its form, it was 
itself constituted and authorized by the sovereign, which held ultimate author-
ity.21 Democratic government of the Greek kind might well be impossible in the 
modern world, but democratic sovereignty could be revived in acts of self-rule by 
the whole people.22 Within this framing, the U.S. Constitution presents the fun-
damental law adopted by “We the People,” while the various branches and acts 
of the government it creates, whatever their own procedural criteria, ultimately 
derive their legitimacy from a constituent act of democratic sovereignty. 
 
14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra note 28. 
16. TUCK, supra note 8, at 52-53. 
17. See id. at 4-9. 
18. See id. at 181-97. 
19. See id. at 4-9. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 89-107. 
22. See id. at 4-9. 
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A. Premodern Politics 
Tuck traces the distinction between sovereignty and government to the six-
teenth-century French jurist Jean Bodin, who ﬁrst argued that a foundational 
legal order based on the will of the ruler (“sovereignty”) could be kept function-
ally distinct from the ongoing administrative operations (“government”) that 
the ruler might authorize.23 Against the conventional view of Bodin as a royal 
“absolutist,” Tuck argues that Bodin’s immediate purpose in distinguishing these 
levels of legislation was to theorize the role of the French parlements as legitimate, 
if subordinate, government or administration alongside the fundamental sover-
eignty of the king.24 Yet some of Bodin’s earliest and most radical readers quickly 
spotted the possibility that an institutional division of the kind he proposed 
could be ﬂipped around so that the “people” could, theoretically, possess sover-
eignty, even while they would not actively govern.25 
This revolutionary possibility opposed late medieval notions of political le-
gitimacy in which a diﬀerent conception of “the people” had long played a sig-
niﬁcant role. Ancient republics had le� a powerful legacy in the language of pop-
ular legitimation, which inﬂuenced even what we would now consider highly 
unpopular governments from the Roman Principate—itself a kind of quasi-mon-
archy rationalized on popular grounds26—through to the kingdoms that sub-
sumed the Roman Empire in the West. The “popular” basis of these late classical 
and medieval regimes was both rhetorical and institutional. The very structure 
of the early medieval kingdoms, for example, showed a variegated pattern of 
governance that involved extensive power sharing among diﬀerent elites, with 
individuated local mandates and responsibilities, which may have been useful in 
 
23. Id. at 10-12; cf. id. at 49-56 (discussing the originality of Bodin and his divergence from me-
dieval theories of representation). 
24. Id. at 9-10. For the conventional view, see id. at 30-33; and JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN 
AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY (1973). For an important recent analysis of Bodin’s 
“constitutional” thought, see DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL THOUGHT 187-224 (2016). 
25. TUCK, supra note 8, at 63-68. As should be clear, in identifying the origins of constitutional 
thought of a distinctively modern kind in the Bodinian account of sovereignty, we are dis-
counting arguments that imagine various earlier origins, and which see modern constitution-
alism as essentially continuous with pre-modern “constitutional” practices of diverse kinds, 
whether written or customary. On the pre-modern legal sources of modern constitutionalism, 
see LEE, supra note 24. 
26. On the exploitation of Republican rhetorical tropes in the early Principate, see CLIFFORD 
ANDO, IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY AND PROVINCIAL LOYALTY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 29-30, 138-139, 
155-156 (2000). 
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maintaining control over widely dispersed territory.27 Later medieval monarchs 
governed with the help of councils of advisors that introduced a quasi-popular 
element into governance by representing de facto speciﬁc regions or interests of 
the kingdom. Consultative or deliberative participation occurred frequently as 
ordinary citizens presented grievances to their rulers, either individually or as 
part of a corporate group or estate, while monarchs constantly conducted what 
our politicians would today call “listening tours” through their provinces. Fur-
ther, monarchs and their publicists might claim popular consent when they se-
cured undoubted collective goods such as peace and order. It is a modern conceit 
that pre-modern European governments rested on an unargued right to rule al-
leged to come from God or the mere fact of conquest, without reference to pop-
ular will.28 On the contrary, despotisms that did not lay claim to the mantle of 
popular legitimacy were exceedingly rare in Western Europe; indeed, it is not 
clear if there were any. Rather, it is striking what extensive eﬀorts were made in 
regimes that we would today regard as obviously “undemocratic” to argue that 
popular representation was present through responsive governors. 
But one crucial idea was missing from the various conceptions of “popular” 
government that were current when Bodin wrote. Up until the early-modern 
period, observers uniformly considered it inconceivable, a ﬂight of atavistic 
fancy, that “the people” should ever again be able to legislate for itself as a col-
lective agent. This incredulity was not merely a symptom of elite disdain for or-
dinary individuals and their capacities. Instead, the mechanisms of popular gov-
ernment described in the recovered texts on ancient politics and history seemed 
to require a set of favorable circumstances that latter-day Europeans (at least 
outside the Italian city-states29) could no longer count on: most important, a 
 
27. For an overview, see JOHN WATTS, THE MAKING OF POLITIES: EUROPE, 1300-1500, at 68-98 
(2009); see also JOSEPH R. STRAYER, FEUDALISM 57 (1965) (noting that by the end of the 
twel�h century most members of the feudal group possessed some political power). 
28. For example, the “divine right” argument for monarchical absolutism that is o�en mistaken 
as typical of medieval political thought was, in fact, a late and rather desperate Stuart innova-
tion. See, e.g., James I, A Meditation, in KING JAMES VI AND I: POLITICAL WRITINGS 229-49 
(Johann P. Somerville ed., 1994); see also LEE, supra note 24, at 273-315 (explaining Stuart ideas 
of popular sovereignty). The divine right argument for monarchy has loomed large in the 
American historical imagination (for obvious reasons) but it remains much debated how se-
riously it was taken, even at the time it was propounded, and whether it functioned as part of 
a response to claims of Papal supremacy. More generally, it should be noted that pre-modern 
popular and divine legitimations of monarchy were not incompatible (as in Ullman’s famous 
analysis of the ascending and descending theses of medieval monarchy). See WALTER ULLMAN, 
A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 12-14 (1965). 
29. Perhaps the most prominent medieval defender of popular participation in government was 
Marsilius of Padua, who advanced a radical Aristotelian theory. See MARSILIUS OF PADUA, THE 
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polis of manageable size, in which a more or less continuously assembled citizen-
body could meet to rule itself.30 In fact, the argument that democracy simply 
could not work in a modern state (whatever its other merits or demerits) was 
already well worn by the high middle ages: life had become too busy, the tasks 
of government too complicated, and states too large to allow for direct popular 
self-rule.31 Nevertheless, “the people” of the high middle ages were assured that 
they were always already represented in the law-abiding regimes of the age, in 
which a select few ruled over them, even while ruling for them. 
B. Thomas Hobbes 
The great English philosopher Thomas Hobbes will be much more familiar 
to contemporary readers than Bodin, though Bodin’s distinction between sover-
eignty and government was indispensable to Hobbes’s political thought.32 
Hobbes was the founding ﬁgure in the theoretical tradition out of which modern 
constitutionalism would emerge. Although Hobbes is o�en considered an apol-
ogist for monarchical absolutism, it may be more accurate to see him as the ﬁrst 
theorist of modern democracy—an argument that Tuck has previously suggested 
in several works and has now developed fully in The Sleeping Sovereign.33 
Hobbes ﬁercely attacked the core premise of all ancien regime “popular” gov-
ernments: that it was cogent to speak of a “people” that existed independent of 
the constructed institutions of politics, and which could in some fashion accede 
to the arrangements and actions of its ruler. In doing so, he rejected the doctrine 
of “natural sociability,” which he traced to Aristotle’s characterization of a human 
 
DEFENDER OF THE PEACE 67-68 (Annabel Brett ed. & trans., 2005) (discussing forms of pop-
ular government). 
30. For an account that contests that picture of ancient democracy and its limitations, see Daniela 
Louise Cammack, Rethinking Athenian Democracy 94-173 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10423842/cammack_gsas.harvard_0084l
_10724.pdf [http://perma.cc/WQG7-KR68]. 
31. TUCK, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
32. Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty owed a great deal to Bodin’s, as well as to the reworking of the 
discourse of natural law by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, among others. This theory was 
imparted to and subsequently adapted by a host of ﬁgures, including Samuel Pufendorf, John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Emmanuel Kant. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE 
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM 
GROTIUS TO KANT 140-225 (2001) (discussing the impact of Hobbes’s political thought on his 
successors). 
33. See, e.g., Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Democracy, in RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 171 (Annabel Brett et al. eds., 2006). For a summary of the arguments 
concerning the “democratic” Hobbes, see David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: 
Hobbes on International Order, 125 YALE L.J. 618, 636-38 n.86 (2016). 
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being as zoon politikon, an animal whose nature is to be in a polity.34 Pursuing 
instead a line of radical political constructivism, he argued that a “people” was 
an “artiﬁcial” entity—though no less capable of acting than a natural one—
formed through individual consent to collective self-rule.35 When the idea of a 
people is so speciﬁed, it becomes clear that to say that a people has consented, 
spoken, or otherwise acted must mean that certain speciﬁed institutional proto-
cols have been satisﬁed; appeal to “the people” in the familiar consultative fash-
ion, as a brooding völkisch omnipresence, was mystiﬁcation. In any political or-
der, Hobbes argued, sovereignty, or ultimate lawmaking power, must reside 
somewhere: in the majority of the whole community (democracy), in a subset 
(aristocracy or oligarchy), or in one person (monarchy).36 That sovereign, which 
acts on behalf of all who are subject to it, is all there is, strictly speaking, of a 
political “people”—hence Hobbes’s otherwise puzzling statement that, in a mon-
archy, “the King is the people.”37 
In addition to his rigorous speciﬁcation of what could count as sovereignty, 
Hobbes advanced the revival of speciﬁcally democratic sovereignty by setting out 
what it would mean to conceive of a people as sovereign. He recognized the pos-
sibility of democratic sovereignty coexisting with a government organized along 
other lines, as long as some ultimate recourse of collective action remained with 
the whole population.38 For example, he thought a democratic sovereign could 
be in power even where government was conducted by a monarch elected for 
life, so long as the sovereign woke to select a new monarch on the death of the 
last one.39 Thus many kinds of government might arise from popular sover-
eignty and validly claim a mandate from the people—but only if and so long as 
the people could act in a legally legible and binding way. Without such institu-
tional speciﬁcation of popular sovereignty, claims to popular legitimation were 
spurious. 
 
34. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 71 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642) (rejecting the Aristotelian conception of man as zoon 
politikon). 
35. Id. at 72 (describing human society as based on agreement that is “artiﬁcial”); see also THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) (“For by Art is 
created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which 
is but an Artiﬁciall Man . . . .”). 
36. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 91-92. 
37. Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted). 
38. See id. at 94-95. 
39. See sources cited infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
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Most fundamentally, Hobbes put democracy at the heart of social contract 
theory in arguing that all sovereignty was originally democratic.40 Hobbes ar-
gued that, because there was no natural political community, the consent to form 
a commonwealth must ﬁrst be reciprocal among all members of the polity-to-
be. Having thus mutually agreed to bind themselves to a common will, the peo-
ple thus constituted are “almost by the very fact that they have met, a Democ-
racy,”41 recognizing the decision of a majority as their authoritative will. A core 
and consistent method of the social contract tradition following Hobbes was to 
trace the legitimacy of political power ultimately to popular consent—or else to 
ﬁnd a way around this key presupposition. 
Hobbes did argue that the (democratic) sovereign power, once established, 
might then be transferred to a subset of the population (creating an aristocratic 
sovereign), or to one ruler (forming a monarchical sovereign).42 He argued, 
however, that this decision—the foundational sovereign act preceding and set-
ting the terms of all others—must be by majority (and, indeed, might result in a 
decision to retain democratic sovereignty, taking subsequent decisions by major-
ity vote).43 Thus, at the base of every “instituted” commonwealth—which he 
distinguished from those polities resulting from mere “conquest”—was a con-
stituent act of democratic sovereignty, even if, as in most societies that history 
had known, the subsequent acts of sovereignty took nondemocratic forms.44 
C. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
The great eighteenth-century polymath Jean-Jacques Rousseau detonated 
the democratic dynamite that Hobbes had deeply embedded in his social contract 
theory. Rousseau insisted that the constituent democratic sovereignty described 
by Hobbes was nontransferable.45 (As Tuck points out, Rousseau technically 
corrected an inconsistency in Hobbes, who elsewhere held that a sovereign ruler 
could not transfer sovereignty wholesale, for instance, to a foreign monarch.46) 
 
40. See HOBBES, supra note 34, at 94; see also Grewal, supra note 33, at 635-38 (summarizing 
Hobbes’s argument concerning the democratic commonwealth). Note that a similar line of 
argument seems to have been pursued in the early seventeenth century by the Spanish theorist 
Francisco Suárez. See ANNABEL S. BRETT, CHANGES OF STATE 127 (2011). 
41. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 94 (emphasis omitted). 
42. Id. at 95-96. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 102 (distinguishing a civitas institutiva from a civitas acquisita). For further discussion, 
see Grewal, supra note 33, at 636-38. 
45. See TUCK, supra note 8, at 139-41. 
46. See id. at 139-40. 
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The consequence was that, for a polity to be governed by law, its fundamental 
norms must be products of majoritarian decision making. Rousseau was per-
fectly willing to accept the radical consequences of this principle: most polities, 
he wrote, had no laws in his strict sense, but were instead governed by the de-
crees of their rulers.47 
As Tuck makes clear, Rousseau did not intend an unrealistic call to reconsti-
tute the continually assembled democracies of the ancient world, but rather be-
lieved that majoritarian voting across a large and dispersed population could also 
count as an exercise of democratic will.48 This view was predicated on the 
Bodinian distinction between sovereignty and government, and it followed that 
a sovereign people might create any sort of government it pleased, including a 
monarchical one; but also that those political acts Rousseau called “legislation,” 
which set the basic terms of the polity for all its members, must be exercises of 
sovereignty and hence actually democratic.49 Otherwise, the exercises of “legis-
lative” power were not self-rule, but rather tyrannical usurpations of the sover-
eign power by formally subordinate government.50 
Rousseau’s account thus traces all legitimate political power to democratic 
consent. As his remark that most polities have no laws suggests, he was both 
keenly aware of the prospect of governmental usurpation and generally pessi-
mistic about it, seeing it as the major tendency of all states.51 While, for Hobbes, 
the chief question was where sovereignty was located (in majority, council, or 
monarch), for Rousseau it was whether, and on what terms, the ever-sovereign 
people might maintain collective self-rule rather than accede to governmental 
usurpation. In Rousseau’s view, the people’s sovereignty could never be surren-
dered; yet it was at constant risk of neglect, from the popular side, and usurpa-
tion, from the governmental side. An urgent question thus emerged: How to 
check usurpation and enable the people to remain sovereign under conditions of 
only intermittent assembly. 
 
47. See id. at 131-34. 
48. Id. at 141-42. 
49. Id. at 1-9, 129-36 (discussing the sovereignty-government distinction in Rousseau and how it 
allowed him to advance a modern theory of democracy). 
50. As Tuck notes, Rousseau’s deﬁnition of “legislation” can prove a bit elusive and does not pre-
cisely track other conceptions of what a sovereign act is or would have to be. See id. at 133-34. 
51. Note that much of Book III of The Social Contract is concerned with governmental usurpation, 
which is how Rousseau thought most states would fall. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DIS-
COURSES 149, 209-25 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002). According to Rousseau, laziness, selﬁshness, 
and the other ordinary vices tend to lead governments to usurp the proper power of sover-
eigns, and the people to allow sovereignty to be stripped from them in this fashion. Id. 
the original theory of constitutionalism 
677 
This issue ﬁgured in Rousseau’s thought as the heart of a radical standard of 
political legitimacy, one that sought to revive ancient self-rule for the conditions 
of modernity.52 Soon enough, it would become the crux of the problem of mod-
ern constitutional design: How could the people stand as the authors of their 
own fundamental law, then step back to permit a designated government to do 
its work, all the while retaining, within the constitutional framework they had 
established, the capacity to step forward again and reclaim their political author-
ity? To follow the metaphor, how could the sovereign sleep, as the modern dem-
ocratic sovereign must mostly do, yet still rule rather than succumb to usurpa-
tion? And because in the bright light of post-Hobbesian analysis there is no 
organic “people,” only a set of polity-constituting procedures that unify a multi-
tude, the question must also be put in rigorously institutional terms: What acts 
does a constitution prospectively recognize as sovereign, so that, if and when 
they occur, the people will both have spoken and, crucially, have understood 
themselves to have done so? In light of the social contract tradition, this is the 
question that modern constitutions must address, in which the program of re-
viving classical self-rule is partially and problematically reconciled to the features 
of political modernity. 
D. The Revolutionary Generation 
The late-eighteenth-century revolutionaries struck upon an institutional 
way of putting the sovereignty-government distinction into practice: the consti-
tutional referendum, which allowed for the adoption of fundamental law by ma-
jority (or super-majority) vote to establish the subsequent procedures and limi-
tations of regular government. Although Tuck devotes considerable attention to 
the role that referenda and related mechanisms played in the ideological conﬂicts 
and institutional experiments of the French Revolution,53 here we concentrate 
for obvious reasons on the earlier and more enduring American instances of this 
transatlantic constitutional eﬄorescence. In May 1778, revolutionary Massachu-
setts held the ﬁrst constitutional plebiscite in world history. The question put to 
 
52. See TUCK, supra note 8, at 2-9 (discussing several works where Rousseau analyzes the logisti-
cal diﬃculties in renewing ancient democratic government under modern conditions, working 
out instead a conception of democratic sovereignty). 
53. Id. at 149-80. Tuck associates the constitutionalist solution to the problem of popular sover-
eignty with the Girondin revolutionary faction. By contrast, the Jacobin eﬀort was to achieve 
direct and continual popular self-rule, i.e., democratic government rather than sovereignty, 
which indeed proved impossible and resulted in the assumption of political authority by Pa-
risian factions claiming to act on behalf of the national people. See id. at 158-60. 
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its citizens was whether to adopt a proposed constitution.54 In the pathbreaking 
decision to submit the dra� constitution to a direct vote of the citizenry, the Gen-
eral Court (the state legislature) seemed to agree with radicals in the state who 
insisted that only a majority of the people could adopt a “fundamental Consti-
tution,” and that a mere “Representative Body” lacked the power to promulgate 
fundamental law.55 New Hampshire followed suit with constitutional referenda 
in 1778, 1781, and 1783, and was the ﬁrst state to regularize the sovereignty-gov-
ernment distinction by adopting an exclusive provision for constitutional 
amendment requiring approval by two-thirds of voters.56 
Beyond these signal instances, Tuck shows that the revolutionary generation 
was widely familiar with the proposition that a majority of the people, acting in 
its sovereign capacity, was free to dissolve the government and replace it with a 
new one.57 Such a proposition, of course, lay behind the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which declared “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish” an un-
suitable government and “to institute new Government.”58 Early state constitu-
tions were replete with pronouncements that “all political power is vested in and 
derived from the people only,” who have “the sole and exclusive right of regulat-
ing the internal government and police thereof,”59 and that “all power is vested 
in, and consequently derived from, the people,” and “a majority of the people 
hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abol-
ish” any government that does not conduce “to the public weal.”60 
In turning from the history of political thought to the history of constitu-
tional promulgation, Tuck scrutinizes a key issue in constitutional design: 
whether the fundamental law can be altered by the legislature or only by a special 
appeal to the people. Empowering the legislature to alter the constitution would 
be governmental usurpation within the Rousseauvian conception, for the con-
stitution established the subordinate government in the ﬁrst place. The “pure” 
 
54. Id. at 191-92. 
55. Id. at 192 (quoting a contemporaneous petition of the residents of Pittsﬁeld, Massachusetts). 
Even John Adams urged this method of constitution-making on his fellow delegates to the 
Continental Congress in 1775. Id. at 194-95. 
56. Id. at 196. 
57. Id. at 198-205; see also Mark Somos, Boston in the State of Nature, 1761-1765: The Birth of an 
American Constitutional Trope, 3 JUS GENTIUM J. INT’L LEGAL HIST. (forthcoming 2018) (on ﬁle 
with author) (detailing the prevalence of the “state of nature” trope and related social-contract 
theoretic vocabularies among the colonial Americans, including several prominent revolution-
aries). 
58. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
59. N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. I, II. 
60. VA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 2, 3. 
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form of such a popular appeal was the plebiscite or referendum, but it might also 
take place through a special convention elected to decide a constitutional ques-
tion. The U.S. Constitution came into being through an act of popular sover-
eignty, but it only tenuously preserved the possibility of ongoing sovereign leg-
islation by the people.61 The Constitution’s adoption through special state 
conventions acknowledged its status as an act of democratic sovereignty (though 
it was hotly debated whether that sovereignty was to be understood as realized 
through popular ratiﬁcation in the individual states or whether it was located in 
a new, national people).62 At the same time, however, the Article V amendment 
procedure came perilously close to choking oﬀ further sovereign action by the 
people altogether by making Congress the sole source of proposed amendments 
(upon prompting by state legislatures or conventions) and state legislatures the 
default mechanism of adoption.63 One might question whether the distinction 
between popular sovereignty (via convention or plebiscite) and governmental 
amendment (via Congress and state legislatures) matters much once legislatures 
are themselves popularly elected, as earlier “governments” were generally not.64 
But even if the distinction between popular and governmental modes of amend-
ment counts for less than it once did, Article V makes any amendment exceed-
ingly diﬃcult, all but silencing constitutional lawmaking—thus giving rise to the 
central dilemma of American constitutionalism.65 
One might also question whether the adoption of the U.S. Constitution re-
lied on the theory of popular sovereignty that Tuck traces. Famously, the intel-
lectual and political debates of the Revolutionary and Founding Eras were 
marked by a variety of theories of political order and constitutional authority, 
including Lockean natural law theory and Humean accounts of commercial so-
ciability, while much of the argument over the constitutional design of govern-
ment drew on Montesquieu’s account of the separation of powers. Yet precisely 
in light of this intellectual diversity and ideological discord, it is important to 
 
61. See TUCK, supra note 8, at 209-12. 
62. Id at 205-09. Rhode Island, uniquely, went the plebiscitary route and rejected the proposed 
Constitution by a margin of more than ten-to-one. See id. at 209. On the use of state conven-
tions for ratiﬁcation, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, 308-
09 (2005). On the ratiﬁcation debates more generally, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAM-
ERS’ COUP 397-546 (2016); and PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CON-
STITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010). 
63. See TUCK, supra note 8, at 209-14. See generally U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing the amendment 
process for the U.S. Constitution). This issue is discussed further in Part III, infra. 
64. We address this issue in Part III, infra. 
65. We address this issue further in Part III, infra. 
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focus on what the Framers did in submitting the Constitution to a series of spe-
cially convened conventions outside the extant state legislatures. They appealed 
to a sovereign people distinct from the representative institutions of govern-
ment, thus locating in the people the power to make fundamental law.66 This 
appeal, as Michael Klarman and others have emphasized, was made despite the 
“antidemocratic” sentiments of the Framers—apparent in notable features of the 
federal constitution—who nevertheless thought only popular ratiﬁcation would 
ensure the legitimacy of the new regime.67 Accordingly, the people themselves 
adopted the Constitution, and they did so through a novel institutional form 
that enabled, in principle, popular legislation outside government. 
This mechanism of popular control ﬂourished at the level of the states: 
within a generation of the Founding, state constitutions moved almost uni-
formly to a procedure of plebiscitary amendment.68 Moreover, many states have 
now gone through multiple rewritings and re-ratiﬁcations of their constitutions 
 
66. The use of state conventions for ratiﬁcation proved a complicated matter: on the one hand, it 
established the constitution as the product of constituent sovereign power outside the normal 
channels of government (state legislatures); on the other hand, the requirement of ratiﬁcation 
through conventions kept the decision at a level of removal from the people (as compared to 
referenda) and arguably favored ratiﬁcation given the elite class and educational backgrounds 
of the delegates. See KLARMAN, supra note 62, at 406-412. 
67. Drawing on the earlier work of Woody Holton and Pauline Maier, Klarman has recently pro-
duced a powerful indictment of the “antidemocratic” character of the national government 
proposed by the Framers, which he argues was constructed as a bulwark against rising eco-
nomic populism in the states, with their democratic constitutions. See id. at 244-246 (discuss-
ing the undemocratic federal government compared to the states, and the “contempt” of the 
Framers for democracy). Klarman argues that this “Framer’s coup” was justiﬁed on grounds 
of “popular sovereignty,” which excused the illegal aspects of the enterprise (which went 
against the Articles of Confederation) and yet was also a necessity forced on the Framers by 
the democratic state constitutions. Id. at 607-608. He notes that “[i]ronically, [the Framers] 
were forced to ask ordinary Americans to ratify a constitution, one of the principal objectives 
of which was to constrain the inﬂuence of public opinion upon government.” Id. at 406. Pop-
ular ratiﬁcation sealed the legitimacy of the new order, id. at 243, 416, and established federal 
legislative supremacy over the states, even while the Federalists worried that, as Hamilton put 
it, the “democratical jealousy of the people” would come out against the constitution of an 
undemocratic federal government, id. at 306. For more on the ratiﬁcation contest and back-
ground to what Klarman calls the “coup,” see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007); and MAIER, supra note 62. See also CHARLES A. BEARD, 
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) (argu-
ing that support for the proposed constitution was linked with elite economic interests). Note 
that for our present purposes, recognition of the undemocratic nature of the constituted gov-
ernment does not alter the fact that the Framers turned to popular sovereignty, however re-
luctantly, to legitimate the new constitutional order; this fact generates the interpretive puzzle 
for later generations attempting to read the constitutional text in the light of its legitimating 
principle where the popular sovereign is in enduring sleep, as we argue in Part II, infra. 
68. TUCK, supra note 8, at 197. 
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by some combination of dra�ing convention and adoption by referendum, re-
ﬂecting the intermittent but sovereign power of the people.69 However, with the 
exception of the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, which was adopted by state con-
ventions, formal amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been entirely the 
work of Congress and state legislatures.70 From the point of view of the tradition 
that animated the American Revolution, the popular sovereign has been asleep 
for most of 240 years while its government has ruled in its stead. Indeed, the 
Constitution itself may have prevented the people from waking up. 
i i .  the constitutional paradox 
The Constitution calls “We the People” into being only to constrain sharply 
the same people’s capacity for ongoing constitutional self-rule.71 This constraint 
goes much deeper than the familiar countermajoritarian features of the Consti-
tution.72 The kind of constitutional lawmaking—whether in initial authorship, 
revision, or reaﬃrmation—which in the Founding Era was regarded as the sole 
possible form of democratic self-rule in the large and complex societies of polit-
ical modernity, has proven exceedingly diﬃcult under Article V of the Constitu-
tion. The consequence is that the very form of popular sovereignty to which con-
stitutional law appeals for its legitimacy is inhibited to the brink of impossibility 
under the same Constitution. Constitutional theory and practice are both so 
thoroughly shaped by this paradox that it is fair to characterize them as a series 
of necessarily unsatisfactory eﬀorts to escape it. In this Part, we parse the terms 
of this paradox as expressed in the varieties of contemporary American constitu-
tionalism. 
First, in Section II.A, we explain that the conception of popular sovereignty 
underlying a democratic constitution necessarily combines two ideas, one famil-
iar, the other less so. The ﬁrst is popular authorship: that the people can be said 
 
69. Id. at 189-93, 196-204, 245-47, 254. 
70. Id. at 212. 
71. The “constitutional paradox” of the U.S. Constitution that we analyze in this Part may be 
understood as a signal instance of a more general “paradox of constitutionalism” explored in 
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007), centered 
on the relation of constituent power (in the United States, the sovereign people) to its consti-
tuted authority. 
72. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16-33 (1962) (exploring the “counter-majoritarian diﬃculty” that plagues ju-
dicial review, along with its origins and perplexities). See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE 
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006) (arguing that even apart from judicial review, the pro-
cesses of political decision-making that the Constitution puts in place are pervasively undem-
ocratic). 
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in a genuine, non-obscurantist way to be the original source of authority for their 
own fundamental law. The second is present consent: that what gives fundamental 
law its authority is the consent of the people now living under it, who constitute 
the present sovereign, rather than the fact that it was originally adopted through 
an earlier sovereign act. Taking these together, popular sovereignty must be on-
going and self-renewing, or else fail as a practice of self-rule. 
In the original conception of popular sovereignty, both popular authorship 
and present consent were realized through the majoritarian process of formal 
constitutional ratiﬁcation that we have discussed. We call such exercises of pop-
ular sovereignty univocal constitution-making, because in them a popular ma-
jority qualiﬁes as speaking for “the people” as a whole by satisfying certain pro-
cedural criteria for proposal and amendment. Under this conception, the people 
as a whole are always sovereign: either a sleeping sovereign when not assembled 
for univocal action, or a ruling sovereign during intermittent moments of assem-
bly. 
The image of the people as a sleeping sovereign captures the foundational 
juridico-political ontology of modern constitutionalism. When a group of peo-
ple understands and organizes itself in line with this self-conception, it reﬂex-
ively makes a social world in which “the people” can act with political conse-
quences, including the promulgation of fundamental law. The emergence of this 
ontology was the joint achievement of the conceptual innovation of popular sov-
ereignty and the institutional innovation of the democratic constitution. Outside 
these enabling conditions, it does not make sense to say that the people author 
their own fundamental law—as, for instance, medieval theorists believed they 
could not.73 
We further argue that, under pressure to reconcile the principle of present 
consent with the fact that univocal acts of sovereignty are all but impossible un-
der Article V, American constitutional practice has produced a second juridico-
political ontology, a conception of popular sovereignty as multitudinous that is 
now increasingly inﬂuential in constitutional practice. Here, the people are not 
assembled in a formally self-constituting capacity, but nevertheless exert inﬂu-
ence over constitutional law through other channels such as public argument 
and social-movement mobilization.74 Adapting Hobbesian social contract the-
 
73. See supra Section I.A (discussing the medieval view of classical democracy). 
74. Reva Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States Law, 
http://law.yale.edu/system/ﬁles/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_Jurisgenerative_Role_of
_Social_Movements.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TD3-WXS9]. In a seminal study, Robert Cover 
recognized what he called the “jurisgenerativity” of non-legal actors, such as messianic reli-
gious communities. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
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ory, we call this second ontology a constitutional multitude: the people are con-
ceived here as a subject multitude, but they are subject to a constitutional regime 
that exists by virtue of their own, earlier univocality. 
We argue that when they are not actively engaged in formal constitution-
making or amendment, citizens are simultaneously a “sleeping sovereign” and a 
“constitutional multitude.” But because formal amendment proves exceedingly 
diﬃcult—and thus the sleeping sovereign cannot readily awaken—constitu-
tional theory and practice now reﬂect popular sovereignty’s frustration, rather 
its achievement. 
A. Popular Authorship and Present Consent 
Eighteenth-century constitutional thought and practice combined a concep-
tual innovation with an institutional one to restore both the plausibility and the 
feasibility of democratic self-rule under modern political conditions. As Tuck has 
shown, the conceptual innovation was the distinction between government, the 
everyday business of administration, and sovereignty, the power to adopt the fun-
damental law of the polity.75 The institutional innovation was the referendum 
(sometimes replaced by the special convention) as a mechanism by which the 
people could act in a majoritarian fashion to establish, reject, or revise funda-
mental law—that is, to bring to life the conceptual category of popular sover-
eignty. Together, these innovations made possible a new practice of popular au-
thorship of fundamental law by the political community, thus making it possible 
to take seriously the idea of popular self-rule in basic matters. 
Constitutional lawmaking was not imagined to be a once-and-for-all aﬀair. 
A sovereign majority held no unalterable authority over later generations. Ra-
ther, what gave inherited constitutional law its authority in the present could 
only be the present consent of those now living under it. This present consent was 
rationalized on the basis of what we might call the “original theory of original-
ism,” which held unamended text to have been tacitly repromulgated by the cur-
rent sovereign.  
The principle of present consent was taken for granted among the political 
theorists whose work Tuck examines, and reﬂected the general practice of legal 
repromulgation where sovereigns succeeded one another over time.76 For exam-
ple, Bodin, in his Republique of 1576, claimed that “it is well known that the laws, 
 
75. See discussion supra Part I. 
76. Note that such repromulgation was tacit when laws were le� unchanged rather than formally 
reenacted through new legislation. This form of tacit legislation is not the same as the famous 
discussion of tacit consent in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
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ordinances, letters patents, privileges and concessions of princes, have force only 
during their lifetimes unless they are ratiﬁed by the express consent, or at least 
the suﬀerance, of a prince who is cognizant of them.”77 Hobbes argued similarly 
in Leviathan: “[T]he Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were 
ﬁrst made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes.”78 And Rous-
seau famously wrote in the Social Contract: “Yesterday’s law is not binding to-
day; but silence is taken for tacit consent, and the Sovereign is held to conﬁrm 
incessantly the laws it does not abrogate as it might.”79 
As applied to an explicitly popular sovereign, the idea of tacit legislation was 
familiar to the American revolutionaries and the generation of jurists immedi-
ately following. St. George Tucker argued in his edition of Blackstone’s Commen-
taries: 
That mankind have a right to bind themselves by their own voluntary 
acts, can scarcely be questioned: but how far have they a right to enter 
into engagements to bind their posterity likewise? Are the acts of the 
dead binding upon their living posterity, to all generations; or has pos-
terity the same natural rights which their ancestors have enjoyed before 
them? And if they have, what right have any generation of men to estab-
lish any particular form of government for succeeding generations? 
 
The answer is not diﬃcult: “Government,” said the congress of the 
American States, in behalf of their constituents, “derives its just authority 
from the consent of the governed.” This fundamental principle then may 
serve as a guide to direct our judgment with respect to the question. To 
which we may add, in the words of the author of Common Sense, a law 
is not binding upon posterity, merely, because it was made by their an-
cestors; but, because posterity have not repealed it. It is the acquiescence 
 
305-09 (John Murray ed., 1832), which discusses theories of tacit consent to the social con-
tract. The latter concerns individual consent to the laws one lives under; the former concerns 
tacit collective consent to a law that could be changed because it is le� unchanged. See also 
infra note 83 for further discussion of contemporary legal theories of tacit legislation. 
77. TUCK, supra note 8, at 266 (quoting JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE 91 
(Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Richard Knolles trans., 1962) (1576)). 
78. Id. at 266 (quoting HOBBES, supra note 35, at 185-86); see also Thomas HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 
OR, THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMON WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 139 
(London, Green Dragon 1651). 
79. TUCK, supra note 8, at 267 (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND 
DISCOURSES 78 (Ernest Rhys ed., G.D.H. Cole trans., 1923) (1762)). 
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of posterity under the law, which continues its obligation upon them, 
and not any right which their ancestors had to bind them.80 
Tucker here cites Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (an enormously inﬂuential 
text during the American Revolution), though Paine is clearest on this point in 
his later Rights of Man, which defends the French revolutionary experiment 
against Burke: 
It requires but a very small glance of thought to perceive, that altho’ laws 
made in one generation o�en continue in force through succeeding gen-
erations, yet that they continue to derive their force from the consent of 
the living. A law not repealed continues in force, not because it cannot be 
repealed, but because it is not repealed; and the non-repealing passes for 
consent.81 
James Wilson observed a corollary of this point when he insisted around the 
time of the Constitution’s adoption that, “The people may change the constitu-
tion . . . whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive 
institution can ever deprive them.”82 
These illustrative examples from the Founding Era and early republic are 
not, of course, intended to suggest that those who made and interpreted the 
Constitution generally regarded it as inherently revisable, independently of or 
outside Article V. What is clear, however, is that, as we argued in Part I, the the-
ory of popular sovereignty makes by far the best sense of the constitution-mak-
ing of the Founding Era, and those who reﬂected on that theory consistently 
assumed that democratic sovereignty would be made ongoing through present 
consent. Whether the repromulgation of past law is made explicit in political 
practice or remains implicit in popular self-understanding and judicial interpre-
tation, it nonetheless requires a sovereign that could decide not to repromulgate 
but instead to amend and revise.83 To the degree that Article V inhibits rather 
 
80. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES Note D I.8, App. 172-73 (St. George Tucker ed., 
1803). 
81. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 94 (Mark Philp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1791) 
(emphasis omitted). 
82. 1 JAMES WILSON, WORKS 191 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 
2007). 
83. As Tuck notes, contemporary interest among legal theorists in the process of tacit legislation 
(repromulgation of past law by the present sovereign) seems to have waned a�er H.L.A. Hart 
argued in his famous The Concept of Law that sovereign legislation was not a general feature 
of all legal systems, particularly those that recognized customary law. See H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 60-64 (1961). However, Tuck argues that a theory of tacit legislation is nev-
ertheless speciﬁcally required for the account of democratic sovereignty, as was recognized by 
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than facilitates present consent, it frustrates the very basis of the Constitution’s 
authority. 
B. Univocal Sovereignty 
Constitutional lawmaking by referendum or special convention is what we 
call a univocal mode of political change, because in it a “people,” artiﬁcially con-
stituted from naturally distinct individuals through an authoritative process, acts 
with one voice. Univocality is at the heart of social contract theory’s juridico-
political ontology: it is predicated upon the form of collective consent that turns 
a mass of individuals (a “multitude” in the “state of nature”) into a uniﬁed po-
litical agent (the “body politic” and cognate terms). Such a uniﬁed agent can 
“speak,” and, under the positivist account of law tied to this theory,84 can issue 
commands that constitute the law of the polity. In democratic regimes, the ful-
ﬁlment of an authoritative procedure—victory in a properly posed referendum, 
for instance—means that, as a matter of constitutional law, “the people” have 
spoken. 
The principle of popular authorship and the principle of present consent ﬁt 
together in an aspiration to collective self-rule through political univocality. The 
principle of popular authorship proposes a form of political emancipation: that 
people should make the fundamental laws that they live under rather than re-
ceiving them from custom or from ruling elites. The principle of present consent 
holds that the people whose authorization of fundamental law counts are those 
who live under it today. The latter principle amounts to an assurance that, in 
principle at least, constitutional text should not become a fetishized source of 
authority for future generations simply because it was adopted by a popular sov-
ereign at an earlier time. Self-rule is a present and continuing project, or it is the 
rule of the dead. 
The possibility of popular self-rule in modernity depends upon an intermit-
tent univocality. As noted earlier, Tuck’s study takes its title from the Hobbesian 
image of this problem: that of the sovereign who sleeps. As Hobbes describes in 
On the Citizen, when an individual sovereign (a king) sleeps, he remains sover-
eign, even though his ministers may have to make decisions on his behalf. Such 
decisions are legitimate only if governed by the last relevant orders that the king 
issued before sleeping.85 
 
its early theorists, who found a way to rationalize customary legal sources within its scope. 
For further discussion, see TUCK, supra note 8, at 266-78. 
84. On Hobbes’s positivism, see Martin Loughlin, The Political Jurisprudence of Thomas Hobbes, in 
HOBBES AND THE LAW 5-21 (Dyzenhaus & Poole eds., 2012). 
85. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 99-100. 
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By analogy, when a sovereign people is not assembled, but there exists a “cer-
tain time and place”86 or a deﬁnite procedure for its reassembly, it remains sov-
ereign in the polity even though decisions must be taken day-to-day, even year-
to-year, by the government it has established. In any polity where the people 
hold sovereignty, the sovereign will o�en sleep: the nonassembly of the people 
under ordinary political circumstances is the necessary accommodation to mod-
ern conditions that lent its shape to this entire political ontology. If, however, the 
sovereign sleeps with no prospect of waking, the matter is very diﬀerent. Sleep 
without waking is death, Hobbes wrote, for a man and also for a polity.87  
In U.S. constitutional history, the sovereign slumber has lasted very long and 
is diﬃcult to break. The Constitution provides for the reassembly of the people 
in their sovereign capacity via conventions for both the proposal and the adop-
tion of amendments, though either step may also be taken governmentally, by 
proposal of Congress and ratiﬁcation by three-quarters of state legislatures.88 As 
we have noted, however, the convention route has been used only once,89 and 
even governmental amendment is increasingly infrequent in light of both its 
multiple supermajority requirements and the various veto-gates that attend leg-
islative action.90 In such circumstances, it is diﬃcult to say that the sovereign 
simply sleeps, preparing to wake for a new round of lawmaking, or perhaps to 
aﬃrm a new generation’s adoption of the fundamental law promulgated by an 
earlier act of the same polity. The better interpretation would be to say that the 
sovereign has fallen into a coma, or is imprisoned—and by the same act of con-
stitution-making that brought it into being. 
We can also say that the situation created by Article V drains plausibility from 
the ontology of univocal sovereignty. How, in the absence of any real possibility 
of revisiting the text of fundamental law, can a living citizen understand her pol-
ity as reaﬃrming an inherited constitution, let alone seek a change in it as the 
condition of her part in its reaﬃrmation? The idea of popular sovereignty in the 
form of univocal constitutional authorship loses vitality to the degree that its 
institutional form, constitutional amendment, becomes a ﬁctional option. What 
began in Hobbesian sovereignty declines into Hobson’s choice: enthusiastically 
live with the inherited constitution or disgruntledly live with the inherited con-
stitution. To be unable to revise an inherited constitution dilutes the meaning of 
 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
89. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
90. On the diﬃculty of amending the Constitution via Article V, see infra note 98. 
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continually accepting it, for the repromulgation that would indicate present con-
sent depends on the possibility that present citizens could withhold that consent. 
C. Multitudinous Constitutionalism 
How should present-day citizens regard a constitution whose authority is 
rooted in popular authorship and present consent, but which they have no pro-
spect of revisiting, and hence no real standing to repromulgate?91 How should 
jurists and theorists account for the authority of such a constitution or the 
speech-acts and political strategies of making novel and contested claims under 
it? How to characterize a constitution that has not been amended but seems, in 
the hands of judges and politicians and social movements, to change its meaning 
over time, and how to understand the status of popular self-rule in such circum-
stances?92 
Under pressure from these questions, American constitutional practice and 
theory have advanced an alternative way in which “the people” might be under-
stood as generating their own fundamental laws. We call this second mode mul-
titudinous constitution-making. It is in this mode that citizens advance claims 
about the meaning of constitutional terms and values through multiple and of-
ten mutually opposing social movements and other forms of political mobiliza-
tion. In this mode, the citizenry is not an institutionally uniﬁed “people” capable 
of acting politically but instead a mass of individuals, a “multitude” in the termi-
nology of Hobbesian contract theory, whatever other social relations may link 
them. 
However, unlike the natural multitude that, in Hobbes’s account, preceded 
civil society in an anarchic “state of nature,” this multitude is a governed multi-
tude, existing within an order of positive, not merely natural law. Such a consti-
tutional multitude is generated by a process of constitutional dispersal, the disas-
sembling of the popular sovereign, which ceases to exercise univocality and 
 
91. For a reﬂection on what constitutional ﬁdelity might mean for African Americans who were 
excluded in the Constitution’s original terms, see Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 
DENV. U. L. REV. 517 (2011). 
92. For accounts of the evolutionary or common-law-like character of constitutional change in 
the United States—in contrast to the punctuated process of univocal sovereign amendment 
(and tacit updating)—see Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 551 (2006); and David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001). 
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becomes again a multitude—but this time, under law.93 Such a possibility is im-
plicit, if unexamined, in Hobbes’s account of sovereignty: unlike a total dissolu-
tion of the social contract (such that sovereignty is lost and the people returned 
to a natural multitude94), and unlike a case in which the people have expressly 
transferred their sovereignty to a council or monarch (and thus become a per-
manent subject multitude95), the constitutional multitude maintains its sover-
eignty in potentio while living under the laws of its previous constitution-making. 
Still deﬁned as sovereign by a prior act of univocality—and still actively contest-
ing the meaning of that act, rather than simply consenting to it in its original 
sense—the constitutional multitude shares a constitution and continues, in infor-
mal ways, to make claims of a constitutional nature on the government. 
In its present dispersal, the American people can be understood as both a 
sleeping sovereign and a constitutional multitude. When considered as poten-
tially assembled but asleep, the mass of citizens preﬁgures the sovereign they 
could become; by contrast, when concurrently considered as subjects of law, the 
same citizens are ruled as a multitude of individuals by the government that they 
summoned into being. A severe view of the multitudinous paths to constitu-
tional change, such as some contemporary originalists advance, would under-
stand them simply as varieties of governmental usurpation. Yet precisely because 
multitudinous change occurs in a constitutional regime founded on an appeal to 
democratic sovereignty, multitudinous claims have a meaning that can be distin-
guished from older appeals to a “people” that was regarded as in principle inca-
pable of acting, and so was unavoidably the mere construct of the authoritative 
interpreter (making the government, not the people, sovereign in Hobbes’s 
terms). Under conditions of constitutional dispersal, it is a prior, sovereign, con-
stitution-making act of the people that ultimately authorizes governmental power, 
and the question the present government (for example, members of the Supreme 
Court) must ask ﬁnds its answer at the intersection of the two questions this 
 
93. See HOBBES, supra note 34, at 75, 94-95 (distinguishing between a multitude and a common-
wealth and describing the ways in which a sovereign people may make or fail to make provi-
sion for reassembly, in the latter case losing sovereignty by virtue of this failure). The concept 
of constitutional dispersal is our own, an eﬀort at articulating the implicit ontology of multi-
tudinous constitutionalism in Hobbes’s language. 
94. Id. at 131-41 (exploring the common internal causes of commonwealth dissolution); see also id. 
at 94 (“But if they [the assembled people] split up, and the convention is dissolved without 
deciding on a time and place for meeting again, the situation returns to Anarchy and to the 
condition in which they were before they convened, i.e. to the condition of the war of all 
against all.”). 
95. Hobbes explains that in an (instituted) monarchy, “the whole right of the people is transferred 
to him [the king] by a majority of votes . . . . Once this has been done, the people is no longer 
one person, but a disorganized crowd, since it was one person only by virtue of its sovereign 
power, which they have transferred from themselves to him.” Id. at 96. 
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tradition makes central: what did the original, sovereign act authorize, and what 
is the scope of consent of the presently existing people? When there has been no 
formal amendment, these questions cannot ﬁnd answers that are beyond dis-
pute, but the reason is not, as it was thought to be before modern constitution-
alism, that the people cannot act. It is that they have not yet acted to address the 
issue before the decision-maker, who thus must act as their minister and trustee. 
The minister’s authority is limited because the people’s is not; he is not the sov-
ereign because they are—however muted and baﬄed their expression of sover-
eignty. 
It bears emphasis, nevertheless, that appeals to the original and continuing 
constitutional authority of the people, absent univocal sovereign action, suﬀer 
problems that are so profound as to question their theoretical credibility. Such 
multitudinous claims suﬀer from the same ambiguities as the forms of ancien 
regime consultation that allegedly connected acts of monarchy back to “the peo-
ple,”96 weighing against treating them as evidence of sovereign acts. Lacking the 
imprimatur of any procedure by which the people can be said to have acted in its 
sovereign capacity, appeals to the constitutional demands of a multitude are al-
ways susceptible to charges of opportunism and self-serving interpretation. 
As noted earlier, the original ideal of popular sovereignty was predicated on 
both the conceptual distinction between sovereignty and government and the 
concrete institutional activity of democratic constitution-making, a new category 
of collective action aimed at producing fundamental legislation.97 Multitudinous 
constitutionalism maintains the conceptual distinction between sovereignty and 
government, while giving up on the institutional form due to the diﬃculty of 
amending the Constitution. A court’s or other oﬃcial’s claim to update the mean-
ing of constitutional language, if it is to respect the authority of present consent, 
depends on its being done in the shadow of actually available formal amend-
ment. To put it diﬀerently, multitudinous constitution-making depends, con-
ceptually and practically, on univocal constitution-making, not just once (to 
adopt the constitution that is later interpreted) but perennially. If the people can-
not act univocally to resolve a constitutional dispute, then that dispute becomes 
a contest among competing multitudinous mobilizations and oﬃcial interpreta-
tions. These come inevitably to resemble the quasi-popular forms of consultative 
government that claimed warrant in “the people” for centuries before the mod-
ern revival of democracy—a tendency that will likely increase the longer multi-
tudinous claims, not univocal acts, remain the sole mode of constitutional 
change. 
 
96. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
97. See text accompanying supra note 75. 
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Multitudinous constitutionalism has sometimes seemed a way to honor the 
principle of present consent, but only because the U.S. Constitution puts univo-
cal popular sovereignty into a slumber that is very diﬃcult to overcome. Multi-
tudinous claims, with unavoidable ambiguity as to whether the people have spo-
ken and, if so, what they have said, oﬀer a substitute for the mumblings of a 
sovereign that, to amend Hobbes’s vivid image, stirs at the edge of a sleep from 
which it cannot wake. Of course, the substitution is inadequate. In the absence 
of a real prospect of univocal constitutional change, the question as to what the 
people have willed must be decided not through sovereign action, but by gov-
ernmental decision—to wit, usually, the decision of a court that takes cues from 
movements, commentators, and others who oﬀer themselves as synecdoche for 
a dispersed and potentially sovereign people. This way of proceeding does not 
solve the problem that the modern project of popular sovereignty foundationally 
addressed: how the people may promulgate their own fundamental law, and so 
rule themselves. Instead, it recapitulates the situation that the project of popular 
sovereignty sought to overcome: the power to decide the fundamental law lies 
not with any intelligible act of the people, but with competing oﬃcial interpret-
ers who make clashing appeals to a “people” that cannot speak for itself, even if 
it once did, long ago. 
i i i . l iving with article v  
The basic divisions in American constitutional theory today are best under-
stood as competing responses to enduring problems set in motion by the inter-
action between the concept of popular sovereignty, as enshrined in original con-
stitutional authorship, and the ever-elongating period in which such authorship 
cannot be renewed through univocal sovereign action, due to the diﬃculty of 
Article V amendment.98 In this Part, we set out a typology of the ways in which 
eﬀorts to theorize the constitutional order produce recurrent forms of dissonance 
 
98. For current analyses of Article V that address the rarity of its use, see Richard Albert, Consti-
tutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2014) (studying 
the decline in Article V’s use and arguing that Article V may be at risk for informal amendment 
by constitutional desuetude); and Strauss, supra note 92, at 1459 (arguing that constitutional 
change has so seldom come through the Article V route that American constitutionalism 
should be understood in an evolutionary lens); see also Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Con-
stitutional Change (or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) 
< 26; (B) 26; (C) > 26; (D) All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 411 (1991) (question-
ing what is in or outside the formal amendment process). For a discussion of how “sunrise 
amendments” might enable constitutional change via the Article V route, and an analysis of 
how such temporally delayed amendments could remain democratically legitimate, see Daniel 
E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking 
and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015). 
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and frustration, as scholars and jurists attempt to ﬁnds paths of escape from the 
constraints in which popular sovereignty is imprisoned. Each major approach to 
theorizing constitutional law is haunted by the specter of popular sovereignty in 
one way or another. In some cases, a theory appeals to popular sovereignty while 
implicitly supposing that it can never actually achieve univocal expression. In 
others, a theory turns away from the appeal to popular sovereignty only to ﬁnd 
itself waylaid by the persistence of the Constitution’s original font of authority, 
an earlier set of appeals to popular sovereignty that continues to shape the pre-
sent. In short, constitutional theory and practice can neither achieve nor do with-
out univocal popular sovereignty—except through the radical assertion that con-
stitutional law really is about something other than the self-rule of “We the 
People.” Even this last strategy, playing Hamlet without the Prince, does not es-
cape the spectral hauntings that ﬁll Elsinore and make it impossible to change 
the subject from the decisive acts of the past. 
A. The Curious Twinning of Originalism and Living Constitutionalism 
Both originalism and living constitutionalism must ultimately appeal to the 
sovereignty of “We the People.” As interpretive strategies, however, both turn 
out to be normatively plausible only on the condition that univocal constitution-
making remains a live possibility. Without that prospect, they fall into forms of 
indeterminacy and elite partisanship, which inevitably involve some combina-
tion of the dead-hand problem (thwarting the principle of present consent) and 
governmental usurpation (thwarting the principle of popular authorship). 
Originalism has seemed to many scholars and jurists to be the mode of con-
stitutional interpretation uniquely suited to enforcing prior acts of popular sov-
ereignty, because it ostensibly minimizes a judge’s capacity to abjure the earlier 
sovereign act in favor of other values that have not been made fundamental law. 
Hence the frequent invocation of constitutional ﬁdelity as the special virtue of 
originalist interpretation. As portrayed by many of its adherents, originalism 
battles to protect the special authority of popular authorship from “lawless” and 
“illegitimate” usurpation of popularly ratiﬁed fundamental law by judicial inter-
pretation or legislative and executive overreach.99 
This self-presentation, however, proves implausible for two reasons that 
have emerged in our discussion. The ﬁrst pertains speciﬁcally to originalism. 
Once popular sovereignty is understood—as it originally was—to encompass the 
 
99. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing 
the majority’s opinion as “unabashedly based not on law”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since it is entirely clear that the Constitution of the 
United States—the old one—takes no sides in this educational debate [concerning the consti-
tutionality of sex-segregated public higher education], I dissent.”). 
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joint principles of popular authorship and present consent, it becomes clear that 
originalism is not uniquely suited to maintaining it. On the contrary, judges 
might seek to synchronize popular authorship with present consent through ei-
ther an originalist or a nonoriginalist interpretive strategy. Either strategy would 
necessarily entail an assumption about the meaning of sovereign silence: what 
content of present consent is indicated by the sovereign’s continuing to sleep. 
Under the most plausible originalist strategy, a judge is to assume that current 
silence indicates present consent to the best contemporary reconstruction of the 
original meaning of the fundamental law, and so her task is to achieve an inter-
pretive fusion of horizons with the past, seeking to carry its meaning into the 
present.100 Alternatively, under the nonoriginalist strategy, the judge is to assume 
that sovereign silence tasks her with semantic updating: she treats today’s sov-
ereign people as having consented to tacit repromulgation of past law, which 
would thus require a contemporary rendering of the Constitution’s language.101 
The eﬀort to synchronize popular authorship with present consent might 
well take either form. Tuck himself ends up tentatively endorsing semantic up-
dating as the most plausible present extension of the original theory, an approach 
he notes Akhil Reed Amar has developed in his important work on democratic 
constitutionalism.102 
 
100. On this interpretive goal, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1823 (1997). For an argument that unless Article V has been exercised, it is the responsi-
bility of American judges to seek to achieve this sort of interpretation, see William Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). 
101. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 4 at 62-74 (arguing for integration of constitutional text with 
contemporary values in a synthetic interpretive process that makes the Constitution “our law” 
for the living). 
102. As Tuck observes, supra note 8, at 280, Amar presents the version of semantic updating that 
most closely tracks the original account. Indeed, Amar’s work best captures what might be 
called the “original theory of originalism,” or perhaps more precisely, the original theory of 
textualism. From early studies, such as Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Consti-
tutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994), through AMAR, supra 
note 62, Amar has identiﬁed the constituent power in the United States as the sovereign peo-
ple and examined what this original commitment to univocal sovereignty entails for constitu-
tional law, historically and presently. Semantic updating in line with contemporaneous public 
understanding, he argues, is not merely the best way to construe the document as a whole. 
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 469, 
472 (1995) (considering semantic updating in the context of the impact of the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments on the Constitution as a whole). He argues very plausibly that it is 
also indicated in the structure of the amendment process, which proceeds through chrono-
logical accrual. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 52-53 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he practice of inscribing 
amendments in chronological order” makes clear the “temporal trajectory of the overall doc-
ument”). 
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The second problem applies to both originalism and living constitutional-
ism. Neither approach can remain plausible across time as a technique of instan-
tiating popular sovereignty in the absence of the real possibility of renewed uni-
vocal constitution-making. This diﬃculty is perhaps especially vivid in the case 
of originalism. Because the constitutionally determined route to amendment is 
substantially blocked, a commitment to univocal constitution-making implies 
ever-increasing reliance on long-ago lawmaking, leading conventional original-
ism toward reaction and antiquarianism103—or rendering an emphasis on uni-
vocal sovereignty appealing to those who are independently well-disposed to-
ward reaction and antiquarianism. In our present constitutional circumstances, 
originalism inexorably combines a theoretical championing of univocal sover-
eignty with a practical defense of the past (or the restoration of an arguably 
mythic past, as in the establishment of the individual Second Amendment right 
to gun ownership).104 These features of originalist adjudication are not, as is of-
ten argued, the necessary consequence of ﬁdelity to popular sovereignty; rather, 
they are symptoms of the breakdown of popular authorship under Article V, 
which makes indeterminate the meaning of sovereign silence today. 
Living constitutionalism fares little better (if at all) than originalism on this 
point. It represents the other horn of the same interpretive dilemma. Living con-
stitutionalism rejects the rule of the “dead hand” and insists that the ultimate 
arbiter of fundamental law must be the present political community.105 (For in-
stance, no understanding of “equal protection” can today presuppose the sub-
stantial exclusion of women from politics, the professions, and large parts of the 
labor market.) The rationale for deriving such an interpretive strategy from a 
commitment to popular sovereignty ranges from the legal ﬁction that today’s 
political community tacitly repromulgates the Constitution with present mean-
ing by failing to amend it, to the more diﬀuse idea that democratic allegiance 
 
103. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Proﬁling Originalism, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) (discussing the empirical partisan and ideological aﬃnities of 
originalism). 
104. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191 (2008) (making the case that the originalist argument for an individual Second 
Amendment right to possess ﬁrearms was a product of contemporary political mobilization). 
105. On the “dead hand” problem, see the symposium following Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and 
the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1998). On the question of textualism and dem-
ocratic legitimacy, see in particular Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998); and Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand 
of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998). See also Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Argu-
ments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008) (discussing the same). 
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requires today’s citizens to “make the Constitution our own” by giving it mean-
ings, however contested, that “we” can credit as fundamental law.106 On any ac-
count, however, living constitutionalism’s claim to maintain popular sovereignty 
faces the same challenge as originalism: its legitimacy depends on the possibility 
that the people are ready and able to engage in univocal lawmaking if and when 
tacit legislation no longer suﬃces to realize popular will. Where the content of 
present consent can in principle be expressed decisively and without ambiguity, 
judicial updating is both empowered and disciplined by the fact that it takes 
place in the shadow of potential amendment. Where univocal constitution-mak-
ing is inhibited, however, as it is under Article V, controversial acts of judicial 
interpretation, and their theoretical elaboration by scholars, will inevitably be 
drawn into arguments that cannot be resolved in the terms in which they are 
made. Their claim to authority must be that their respective interpretations are 
faithful to popular sovereignty as expressed in present consent; but there is no 
prospect of deciding between competing interpretations by concrete appeal to 
the popular sovereignty that all invoke. Instead, even as they perennially admit 
of competing alternatives and yet-more-controversial extensions, clashing con-
stitutional interpretations will be resolved by governmental rather than sover-
eign decisions: judicial majorities, presidential appointments, Senate conﬁrma-
tions (or delays), and so forth. 
It is the substitution of governmental decision-making for popular univocal-
ity that invites originalists’ charges of usurpation (although, as we have seen, the 
originalist alternative does not escape these diﬃculties). Although Justice Scalia’s 
polemical lament that “my Ruler . . . is a majority of the nine lawyers” on the 
Supreme Court107 exaggerates the autonomy of courts by ignoring the political 
factors that enable and constrain successful constitutional argument, it is none-
theless true that living constitutionalism represents a return to the very situation 
that constitutional popular sovereignty had aimed at escaping—one in which 
“the people” cannot act directly in politics, and so is instead invoked by a series 
of motivated interpreters to competing political ends. To satisfactorily reﬂect 
popular sovereignty, living constitutionalism needs a viable prospect of popular 
 
106. See BALKIN, supra note 4 at 62-64 (arguing for an interpretive method that would integrate 
the Constitution with basic commitments to today’s moral and political community); TUCK, 
supra note 8, at 266-74 (endorsing the tacit legislation view). For a recent account sympathetic 
to informal mechanisms of constitutional change, see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010). 
107. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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amendment just as originalism does. Article V of the Constitution substantially 
denies it to them both.108 
This situation presents constitutional interpreters with a stark choice. They 
can appeal to popular sovereignty, the ostensible basis of the U.S. Constitution; 
they can appeal to constitutional practice, including both the formal amendment 
process of Article V and the larger body of constitutional advocacy and interpre-
tation; but they cannot do both without producing various kinds of dissonance 
and implausibility, because the practice has proven incompatible with the popu-
lar sovereignty that is its notional anchor. Because a distinguishing characteristic 
of constitutional thought is its being a rational reconstruction of a practice rather 
than an ideal theory, constitutional thought is distorted by the impossibility of 
doing together the two things that it seeks to join. Its various compromise for-
mations and second-best adaptations must thus be understood not just as the 
ordinary and honorable adjustment of high theory to rough-hewn practice, but 
as symptoms of a systemic disorder. American constitutionalism makes best 
sense by far as an institutional speciﬁcation of popular sovereignty, but that is 
precisely what it now signally and pervasively fails to be—and this failure grows 
more intense with time. 
B. Governmental Sovereignty 
An inﬂuential approach to constitutional theory developed by Bruce Acker-
man seeks to uphold the principle of present consent by imagining popular sov-
ereignty as expressed not only in acts of univocal constitutional law-making, 
such as conventions and plebiscites, but also in extraordinary acts of governmen-
tal politics that constitute “constitutional moments.”109 This approach, which is 
neither originalist nor conventionally living-constitutionalist, is appealing in 
 
108. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Prac-
tices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006) (arguing that popular constitutional-
ism fails to achieve the level of precision that could provide a clear “rule of recognition,” a 
jurisprudential concept indicating that constitutional amendment or reaﬃrmation has taken 
place). 
109. This approach was pioneered by Bruce Ackerman across several works, most prominently his 
We the People series on constitutional turning points in American history. See BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991) (explaining this strategy under the rubric 
of “dualist democracy”); see also Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 
99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) (focusing on the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal); 
Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION (Sanford Levinson, 
ed., 1995) (discussing his idea of higher lawmaking). For a criticism of Ackerman’s account, 
see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Acker-
man’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992). 
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several respects. It maintains a viable institutional speciﬁcation of popular sov-
ereignty in the present, rather than allowing it to recede irrecoverably into the 
past or to mutate into competing multitudinous claims. It also takes advantage 
of the ways in which governmental practices today are far more democratic than 
in the early-modern period when the theory of popular sovereignty was ﬁrst de-
veloped and put to work in constitution-making. If constitution-making was 
distinguished, as Tuck explains, by a relatively inclusive franchise and a then-
unusual degree of straight majoritarianism, these qualities are today much more 
characteristic of our regular elections than of the Article V process.110 Little won-
der that many scholars today argue that popular sovereignty has found its way 
out of Article V and into more creditably democratic political pathways. 
The path of governmental sovereignty, however, does not succeed in over-
coming the problems of indeterminacy that plague living constitutionalism in its 
purer forms, discussed above, for it similarly lacks clear indicia of sovereign law-
making. The ascription of popular sovereignty to extraordinary governmental 
acts faces ambiguity about when “the people” have spoken, and what precisely 
they have said. Various criteria, such as the intensity of debate around an election 
or repeated support for a challenged legislative agenda, are plausible sugges-
tions, but they require controversial inferences from past electoral practices. As 
such, they cannot end debate over whether “the people” have spoken—precisely 
because they deviate from the constitutionally-indicated mode of sovereign 
amendment. Thus, for instance, it remains possible to contest the constitution-
ality of the New Deal (as later twentieth-century conservatives have consistently 
done) in a way that is not true of the Reconstruction Amendments, because it 
prevailed by high-stakes and decisive governmental contests involving all three 
branches of government rather than formal amendments following Article V. 
The lack of decisiveness in governmental sovereignty interacts with a parallel 
lack of explicitness as to what the people aﬃrm when and if they multitudinously 
“speak.” Returning to the example of the New Deal, there clearly was a sense in 
which repeated elections indicated that a majority of Americans—the present 
sovereign on the theory of popular sovereignty—aﬃrmed the program via the 
elections of the 1930s, and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the new reality 
ended doctrinal disputes over the New Deal’s constitutionality.111 But what, pre-
cisely, was the scope of this aﬃrmation? Was it with respect to regulation of the 
economy, of social life generally, or of the administrative state per se? Seeking to 
 
110. See TUCK, supra note 8 at 190-205 (describing the development of plebiscitary constitutional-
ism as the predominant American model). 
111. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255-382 (1998) (presenting the 
political struggle around the New Deal as a “modern” constitutional amendment). 
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draw rough-and-ready principles from the legitimation of the New Deal is a per-
fectly plausible interpretive task, but it is diﬀerent in kind, and necessarily in-
volves more constructive discretion, than giving meaning to a new piece of con-
stitutional text—even one as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
“equal protection of the laws.” 
The problems of governmental sovereignty highlight a pair of points about 
univocal sovereign lawmaking. First, it solves an epistemic problem of indeter-
minacy: the impossibility of resolving diﬀuse disputes over competing claims 
about the content of “fundamental law” rooted in acts of “the people.”112 The 
concept of popular sovereignty did not solve this problem directly, but did recast 
it in terms in which it was susceptible to an institutional solution. That solution 
was the majoritarian appeal to the whole people on certain questions of funda-
mental law. Absent that appeal—that is, without recourse to univocal sovereign 
lawmaking—the earlier epistemic uncertainty returns, and with it comes moti-
vated interpretation in both elite networks and social movements, making “the 
people” again a cipher of indeterminate signiﬁcance. This problem will follow 
eﬀorts to reconceive the locus of popular sovereignty in governmental conﬁgu-
rations of any sort. 
The second, closely related point is that the sovereignty of univocal lawmak-
ing is fundamentally “artiﬁcial,” to borrow Hobbes’s terminology again.113 
Through the speciﬁcation of a majoritarian decision procedure, the multitude 
becomes a people that can speak, and can understand itself to have done so. (If 
the multitude also channels the shared values of an empirically existing social 
community, as it frequently will, this is contingent, and not essential to the po-
litical construction of sovereignty.) The appeal to governmental sovereignty—
however representative the government—shares with living constitutionalism 
the problematic lack of a clear rule of recognition for actions of this constructed 
popular sovereign unmediated by its constituted government. 
C. Democracy Without Sovereignty 
Up to this point, we have argued that neither leading strategy of constitu-
tional interpretation—that is, neither originalism nor living constitutionalism—
can solve the problems of indeterminacy created by a constitution that both rests 
 
112. See supra Section I.A. for a discussion of claims to popular warrant by premodern govern-
ments. The problem of epistemic conﬂict more broadly was central to Hobbes’s articulation 
of sovereignty, as Tuck has repeatedly emphasized. See Richard Tuck, Hobbes, Conscience, and 
Christianity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HOBBES 482-483 (A.P. Martinich & Kinch Hoeks-
tra eds., 2016). 
113.  HOBBES, supra note 34, at 9. 
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its authority on democratic sovereignty and inhibits ongoing exercise of that sov-
ereignty. We have also argued that the problem is not solved by Ackerman’s in-
ﬂuential proposal to treat extraordinary moments of political life, in sub-consti-
tutional “governmental” institutions, as equivalent to constitutional lawmaking. 
The problems of indeterminacy remain. 
Next, we consider a strategy that rejects speciﬁcally constitutional lawmak-
ing as the touchstone of democratic self-rule, and instead focuses on the demo-
cratic character vel non of ordinary governmental institutions. We argue that alt-
hough there is appeal in this move to everyday democracy, it does not overcome 
the problems of Article V. 
1. Putting Governmental Democracy First 
Electoral politics is substantially more majoritarian than the constitution-
making procedures of Article V, and no less inclusive in terms of suﬀrage. Why 
not say, then, that self-rule has lost its special connection with popular constitu-
tion-making under the American dispensation, but that its realization in ordi-
nary electoral politics (“government”) is good enough to count as self-rule, and 
might yet be improved? There are two major conﬁgurations of this shi� in ori-
entation from sovereignty to government as the locus of self-rule. One criticizes 
the variety of ways in which the Constitution inhibits majoritarianism, such as 
its disproportionate representation of small states in the Senate and Electoral 
College. In response, this strategy seeks to rally democratic reform against the 
Constitution’s anti-democratic constraints, even issuing calls to remake “our un-
democratic constitution” through a new exercise of popular sovereignty, such as 
a national constitutional convention or plebiscite.114 Such calls, however desira-
ble, remain utopian rather than practical precisely because Article V speciﬁes the 
path to constitutional amendment as supermajoritarian and representative ra-
ther than popular.115 
The second such approach treats electoral democracy as the main goal of the 
Constitution itself, and orients constitutional interpretation toward clearing the 
 
114. See LEVINSON, supra note 72, at 167-80 (proposing a new act of non-Article V popular sover-
eignty to reform the Constitution). For an analysis of constituent power outside Article V, see 
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
115. Although Article V obliges Congress to call a national convention upon the petition of a su-
permajority of state legislatures, the convention would return its proposals to the legislatures 
for ratiﬁcation, keeping the process governmental and representative. 
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“channels of political change.”116 Historically speaking, this approach was a ra-
tional reconstruction of the New Deal revolution, with its embrace of congres-
sional power and rollback of rights-based brakes on the state, along with the 
Warren Court’s jurisprudence protecting political speech and advancing voting 
rights.117 The move to guaranteeing eﬀective electoral democracy has much to 
recommend it as a pragmatic, second-best way of institutionally specifying a 
practice of popular self-rule. However, it is haunted in its own way by the Con-
stitution’s enshrinement and subsequent inhibition of univocal sovereign law-
making. The unamendable allocation of Senate seats, the Electoral College, and 
other structural barriers to genuine majoritarianism remain. The most acute 
such barrier is, ironically enough, the practice of majority-limiting constitutional 
review, conducted in the name of past sovereign lawmaking but, as argued 
above, inexorably drawn in practice into elite and opportunistic interpretive con-
tests that defy resolution in univocal terms.118 One need only consider the last 
decade’s judicial revisions of the Voting Rights Act, the Aﬀordable Care Act, and 
campaign ﬁnance reform to appreciate how thoroughly judicial review hampers 
democratic government by constantly undermining the ﬁnality of major legisla-
tive actions.119 The turn from an inhibited constitutional univocality to simple 
governmental majoritarianism necessarily fails so long as it takes place within a 
set of fundamental-law constraints that were created by prior acts of popular 
sovereignty, and which no current act of popular sovereignty is realistically avail-
able either to aﬃrm or to repudiate. So long as this situation persists, and judicial 
review is available to revisit legislative decisions, partisans will inexorably take 
their disputes to the courts, and judges (frequently themselves linked with the 
relevant partisan and social movements) will respond.120 
 
116. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980). 
117. See id. at 73-134 (discussing the role of courts in ensuring fair political representation and 
avoiding unfair political entrenchment). 
118. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2005); see also 
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004) (exploring judicial review and its political 
consequences in a range of constitutional democracies). 
119. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating portions of the Voting Rights 
Act); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (invalidating portions of the 
Aﬀordable Care Act); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invali-
dating certain restrictions on campaign spending by corporations). 
120. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT ET AL., A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY AND THE HEALTH CARE CASE (Trevor Burrus ed., 2013) (setting out the timeline of 
public legal argumentation from the blog Volokh Conspiracy that brought the Aﬀordable Care 
Act’s individual mandate to the brink of invalidation); DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE 
POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (discussing instances of 
this phenomenon, including same-sex marriage and individual gun rights). 
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2. An Objection: Does Sovereignty Matter Today? 
A related objection concerns whether the distinction between sovereign and 
governmental lawmaking should continue to command our interest today. It was 
developed, a�er all, in times and places where the quotidian activity of govern-
ment was far less inclusively representative or continuously accountable than 
ours. With regular elections at all levels, surely our everyday legislative and ex-
ecutive actions have democratic pedigrees that greatly exceed those of early-
modern governments and, indeed, those of early-modern plebiscites and con-
ventions? In one sense, this is clearly right: the sovereignty-government distinc-
tion took some of its original force from the fact that actually existing govern-
ments were profoundly undemocratic, making an appeal to the people 
qualitatively diﬀerent.121 Today, decisive acts of ordinary representative govern-
ment more closely conform to voter preferences, and so might plausibly seem 
rooted in “the people” without need to appeal to the special category of sovereign 
action. 
But we should not be too quick to conclude that governmental institutions—
in the United States or elsewhere—have solved the perennial problems of repre-
sentation that make direct appeal to the people distinctive and important. They 
have not: the “crisis of representation” remains as acute as ever.122 The tendency 
of representatives toward various forms of economic capture, elite consensus, 
and partisan polarization has hardly disappeared.123 We thus cannot know what 
“the people” want without direct appeal to them. In light of powerful and per-
sistent evidence that the priorities of the majority (whose sovereignty notionally 
authorizes government) diverge from the decisions that elected representatives 
take, there is no basis for abandoning the distinction between popular sover-
eignty and representative government, nor for giving up the ultimate priority of 
popular authority over governmental decision. 
 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. 
122. The much-discussed crisis of representation, also called a “crisis of representative politics” or 
“crisis of representative democracy,” was analyzed by Antonio Gramsci as the condition in 
which established political parties lose an organic link to their constituencies, generating cri-
ses of authority and introducing the possibility of what he called “Caesarism.” See ANTONIO 
GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 210, 219 (Quintin Hoare & Geoﬀrey 
Nowell Smith eds., 2005). 
123. See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014) (ﬁnding that the opinions of mid-
dle- and low-income voters had no meaningful inﬂuence on legislative outcomes). 
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There is another subtler and more controversial reason to regard popular 
sovereignty as distinct from governmental constitution-making, which moti-
vated some early-modern theorists, most clearly Rousseau.124 This is the view 
that the revival of democracy requires more than mere representation: that a ma-
jority achieves something qualitatively diﬀerent from representative government 
when it directly adopts the law that will govern it. This idea has been subject to 
a barrage of criticisms intended to show that it relies on implausible theories of 
agency, such as the hypostatization of a mystical collective agent. Tuck has ar-
gued in an earlier work that this is not the case, and that there is in fact a perfectly 
cogent account of agency in which, upon voting for the winning side in a plebi-
scite, voters act to bring about the result—that is, legislate for themselves.125 
Crucial to this argument is that theorists of voting and other forms of collective 
action have been mistaken in holding that only the pivotal voter can be said to 
have “caused” the result. On the contrary, it is just as natural and intelligible to 
say that each voter who forms a part of the total count suﬃcient for a majority 
has caused the result, and that the people—a majority acting through a stipulated 
institutional form—has in such instances given itself its own law in an unmedi-
ated fashion. While nothing else that we have said depends on this position, ac-
cepting it oﬀers an additional reason to put weight on the distinction between 
government and sovereignty, with the latter enabling direct collective action by 
the citizens of modern regimes. 
D. Reﬁning Judicial Reason 
So far, we have argued that neither living constitutionalism nor originalism 
resolves the dilemma that Article V creates between the twinned principles of 
popular authorship and present consent; that treating elections and other polit-
ical contests as proxies for constitutional lawmaking does not evade the same 
diﬃculty; and that shi�ing emphasis altogether from constitutional lawmaking 
to enhancing electoral (“governmental”) democracy, although attractive, is re-
currently thwarted by the very counter-majoritarian governmental institutions 
that the U.S. Constitution erects and makes exceedingly diﬃcult to revise or oth-
erwise call to account. We now turn to strategies that accept that the interpreta-
tion of fundamental law is lodged persistently, perhaps irremediably, in judicial 
interpretation, and thus seek to locate criteria of legitimacy in judicial reasoning 
itself. 
 
124. TUCK, supra note 8, at 1-9. 
125. See RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING (2008). 
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Two such approaches are inﬂuential. The more modest approach seeks a nu-
anced descriptive account of how judicial cra� can generate and sustain norma-
tive force for controversial decisions that lack unambiguous warrant from either 
government or popular sovereign.126 This is in eﬀect an acknowledgement that 
constitutional theory cannot solve the problem of justiﬁcation that is built into a 
system that establishes the fundamental-law basis of judicial review only to deny 
it the means for ongoing reconnection with popular sovereignty.127 In such cir-
cumstances, judicial review can be understood only in one of two stylized ways: 
externally, as just another locus of political power in the landscape of partisan 
and policy contest, or, internally, as a discursive practice that relies on incomplete 
theorization, overlapping partial justiﬁcations, and potentially inconsistent ap-
peals that may coincide in a given case.128 This approach might be understood 
as a sort of tragic deﬂation of constitutional decisions: reduced to elite interpre-
tive contests, they can be illuminated only by careful attention to their own rules, 
the moves that are available within the mutually enmeshed language games that 
judicial review comprises. It has, at the same time, the dignity of realism. If there 
is no way out of the dilemma of constitutionalism, then one can at least hope to 
grasp clearly the ways in which this dilemma is made productive in actual gov-
ernance, and to train lawyers and judges to be self-aware and free of obscu-
rantism in their navigation of a system that deﬁes precisely the kind of normative 
sense that it purports to express. 
The more heroic approach is to identify the correct resolution of cases with 
some substantive standard whose authority is claimed to be independent of any 
act of a sovereign (democratic or otherwise), thus escaping from the paradox of 
 
126. See BICKEL, supra note 72 (especially chapters 1-2); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-8 (1982) (setting out “modalities” of constitutional argu-
ment); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15-19 (2005) (arguing that American con-
stitutional law can be understood as grounded in the preservation of original understandings 
about where the law was to be applied, along with an evolving repudiation of original under-
standings about where it was not to be applied, and that this account of constitutional change 
is compatible with a view of the Constitution as deriving from popular sovereignty). 
127. For a sophisticated account that analyzes democratic constitutionalism as creating self-bind-
ing commitments over time, which prove available for principled judicial interpretation, see 
RUBENFELD, supra note 126. This account must, however, rely at least implicitly on the possi-
bility of future univocal lawmaking, lest it become impossible to distinguish constitutional 
self-binding from the suppression of sovereignty altogether, which would remove the agent 
whose commitment grounds and legitimates the regime. 
128. See BOBBITT, supra note 126, at 3-119 (taking the internal perspective in describing the doctri-
nal elements of judging); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1-18 
(1998) (taking the external perspective in treating judicial behavior as a species of strategic 
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democratic constitutionalism by changing its legitimating criteria from proce-
dural commitments to substantive outcomes. The most familiar of these stand-
ards is a rights-based conception of constitutional review that looks to a free-
standing idea of legitimate power and/or core human interests for the source of 
the rights that constitutional review should protect.129 Although rights-based 
considerations have generally held sway in constitutional review, in principle, 
outcome-based legitimacy could rest on a diﬀerent standard, such as some con-
ception of economic eﬃciency. Such a standard could readily be applied to, and 
implemented by, all branches of government, including independent agencies 
such as the Federal Reserve.130 
Any such outcome-based conception of legitimacy requires setting aside the 
idea that fundamental law should be the product of democratic self-rule, either 
from the popular-sovereign font of political authority or even from the ongoing 
governmental process of elections and legislation. Instead of putting the pro-
cesses of democracy at its core, an outcome-based approach shi�s the ground 
entirely, focusing on the results that government should produce and the kinds 
of actions it accordingly must and may not take. An outcome-based approach 
implicitly asserts that political modernity should be normatively centered not on 
the revival of democracy, but on something else altogether. Whether it is oﬀered 
as a counsel of despair or as an advance of reason, this would be a drastic shi� in 
the ground of constitutionalism, a surrender of the idea that a people can and 
should rule itself. 
conclusion 
The original theory of constitutionalism provided an account of the concepts 
and institutions that could make possible a revival of democratic self-rule in po-
litical modernity. It held that, although the direct and continuous democracy of 
the classical polis was irrecoverable, a people could nonetheless author its own 
fundamental law in acts of popular sovereignty and continue to authorize or re-
vise that law through the granting or withholding of present consent. The U.S. 
 
129. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 1-38 (1996) (making the case for a moral view of the Constitution); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 355-413 (1986) (discussing constitutional interpretation and the vi-
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Constitution was established through such an act of popular sovereignty, but the 
Constitution itself severely inhibited subsequent exercises of popular sover-
eignty through formal amendment. Our constitutional debates continue to un-
fold within the political ontology created by modern constitutionalism, seeking 
to navigate the poles of popular authorship on the one hand and, on the other, 
the need for present consent, now primarily available through the jurisgenera-
tivity of the constitutional multitude. Although mainstream originalism has re-
turned attention to the popular authorship possible through univocal constitu-
tional lawmaking, its relative indiﬀerence to present consent makes it at most a 
partial realization of the original conception of constitutionalism as ongoing col-
lective self-rule. Living constitutionalism, by contrast, takes present consent se-
riously, but not popular authorship, because it fails to locate an institutional site 
where collective assent to constitutional change could be registered decisively. 
For those of us who remain committed to popular sovereignty as the basis of the 
constitutional order, the puzzle thus remains how to achieve collective self-rule 
under present circumstances of enduring constitutional dispersal. 
 
